Managing Small Spacecraft Projects: Less is Not Easier by Newhouse, Marilyn & Barley, Bryan
Track Preference:   PM Perspectives 
Presentation Title:  Managing Small Spacecraft Projects:  Less Is Not Easier  
Synopsis: 
This presentation tackles the common misconception that managing small spacecraft projects is easier 
than managing large projects.  It identifies unique difficulties, not directly derived from resource 
limitations, faced by managers of small projects and discusses potential mitigations for these difficulties. 
Abstract: 
Managing small, low cost missions (class C or D) is not necessarily easier than managing a full flagship 
mission.  Yet, small missions are typically considered easier to manage and used as a training ground for 
developing the next generation of project managers.  While limited resources can be a problem for small 
missions, in reality most of the issues inherent in managing small projects are not the direct result of 
limited resources.  Instead, problems encountered by managers of small spacecraft missions often derive 
from 1) the perception that managing small projects is easier – if something is easier it needs less rigor 
and formality in execution, 2) the perception that limited resources necessitate or validate omitting 
standard management practices, 3) less stringent or unclear guidelines or policies for small projects, and 
4) stakeholder expectations that are not consistent with the size and nature of the project.  For example, 
the size of a project is sometimes used to justify not building a full, detailed integrated master schedule.  
However, while a small schedule slip may not be a problem for a large mission, it can indicate a serious 
problem for a small mission with a short development phase, highlighting the importance of the schedule 
for early identification of potential issues.  Likewise, stakeholders may accept a higher risk posture early 
in the definition of a low-cost mission, but as launch approaches this acceptance may change. This 
presentation discusses these common misconceptions about managing small, low cost missions, the 
problems that can result, and possible solutions.  
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Introduction (1 of 2)
Small missions are often used as a training ground for developing the next 
generation of project managers
– Lower cost, smaller teams, shorter schedules
– Acceptance of higher mission risk (class C or D)
Problems encountered by managers of small spacecraft missions derive from 
1) A perception that managing small projects is easier – if something is easier it needs less 
rigor and formality in execution
2) A perception that limited resources require/allow the omission of standard management           
practices
3) Less stringent or unclear guidelines or policies for small projects
4) Stakeholder expectations that are not consistent with the size and nature of the project or 
that change as launch approaches
5) A perception that the extensive use of heritage/proven systems and technologies requires 
fewer resources and less experienced development and test personnel
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Introduction (2 of 2)
In reality, managing small, low cost missions can be just as difficult
? Higher risk technical solution
? Same or increased external interfaces
? External (inter-agency or inter-program 
priorities and commitments
? International commitments
? Less experienced personnel or institution
? Limited resources & relative 
organizational hierarchy
Peter Drucker, “Efficiency is 
doing things right; effectiveness 
is doing the right things.”
Presentation addresses these issues from both the program and project 
perspective
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The Team
The team itself is both the biggest strength of and a significant weakness to 
the project manager, i.e. the two faces of the team
– Training ground for inexperienced team members
– Experience on large missions, may not directly transfer
– Often the up-and-coming personnel or the “B” team
– Inefficiencies due to splitting or sharing personnel across projects
– Competition for resources and turnover:  reassignment to more critical missions
– Changing or combined roles and responsibilities
Recommendations
– Ensure sufficient management time for developing project specific policies        
– Clearly define and document roles and responsibilities early in the project;  map against 
traditional roles, responsibilities, and processes to identify and close gaps
– Plan for turnover:  identify staffing alternatives early on, cross-train
– Build in schedule slack to accommodate for inexperience and low-level task maturity
– Develop and maintain processes for communicating policies and training personnel
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Reviews and Reporting
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( r liminary Design) Annual
PPBE Submit
Overall, the NASA life cycle remains the same
– Required NASA milestone reviews and key decision points (KDPs)
Annual Programming Planning Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process–  , , ,     
– Weekly and monthly program, directorate, and institution reporting requirements still 
apply;  agency reporting may apply
– Additional external customer reviews also apply, especially for international missions
Recommendations
– Understand all required internal and external review and reporting requirements
– Carefully negotiate terms of reference (TOR) and review success criteria with the            
program, project, and review board chair
– Include time before and during reviews to “set the stage” and educate the reviewers
– Use waivers and project documentation to clearly document the project approach
– Allow sufficient time for team to develop and internally review packages
– Inexperience project management team may need additional coaching
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Communication
External communication may become more complex
– Language barriers
– Differing process or responsibility assumptions between agencies
– Multiple layers of responsibility 
– Limited dedicated personnel and experience
Internal communication becomes more critical even though smaller team 
appears to favor face-to-face time with management
– Roles and responsibilities may be allocated differently
– Team inexperience may require more coaching
Changes to processes based on mission size and risk posture may require training and–               
monitoring
– Turnover increases the risk of losing critical knowledge
Recommendations
−Develop a communications plan early (need not be formal)
−Ensure paths and mechanisms exist for frequent, scheduled communication
−Monitor that communication is occurring
−Write decisions down; actively use waiver, risk, liens & threats processes to 
make and record decisions
−Manage turnover through planned succession coaching/training
−Capture outcome of mission directorate, program, and project agreements in newly required 
formulation agreement
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Schedules
A well-constructed schedule is more critical as project duration decreases
– 10% behind on a 2 year schedule is ~2 ½ months
– Financial reporting is typically 4 – 6 weeks behind 
– Could only have 1 month to catch and correct problems without tapping reserves
Recommendations
− Build a schedule, but build it smarter: task alternatives and interrelated aspects
− Include all key tasks and products required to meet and pass reviews
− Include communications steps to ensure team can handle the reporting and 
communications requirements
− Look for and include all critical paths: primary, secondary, tertiary relationships
− Ensure no team member goes more than 2 weeks without a tangible product             
or milestone
− Maintain an active list of open issues with firm decision dates that is tracked 
weekly by management
Management team must understand task, reporting, delivery, 
integration and test interrelationships of the schedule
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Earned Value Management (EVM)
Managers often struggle with the return on investment value versus the cost 
of implementing EVM
– EVM is primarily a management tool, not a reporting tool
» Reality says institutional management uses EVM to predict future performance
» Project managers use it to predict their reserve burn rates
Tight schedules limited reserves team inexperience all increase the criticality of timely–  ,  ,         
identification of cost and schedule issues more 
– Cutting corners results in poor quality data
– Required for projects with life cycle costs >$20M
Recommendations
− Do EVM (internally, if not formally required), but make it work for you
− Plan EVM approach and systems in formulation phase
− Tailor for a low-cost mission approach
− Develop an easily communicated and repeatable process
− Actively use the integrated cost and schedule to validate progress          
and identify problem areas
− Understand all risks to maintaining schedule
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Risk Management (1 of 2)
Less stringent or unclear guidelines or policies for small projects
– NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements (NPR 7102.5) and 
Risk Classification for NASA Payloads (NPR 8705.4) provide guidelines for class A and B 
missions
– Guidelines become less stringent for class C and D missions
» If the guideline is “may ” who and how is the decision made regarding what is “good enough”?    ,             
» How is the risk posture defined, documented, accepted, and communicated?
» What are the ramifications for the project and program of those decisions?
» Reviewers, customers, stakeholders, and team members may hold very different views on the 
answers to those questions   
– Unless documented, expectations can change over time especially as launch or “go live” 
approach
» Turnover in project or review team members brings in new ideas and 
loses corporate knowledge  
» Problems or failures on other projects can increase risk aversion
» Risk aversion naturally increases as operational reality approaches
All projects must meet a risk-informed confidence level, 
regardless of project size
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Risk Management (2 of 2)
Recommendations
– Tackle risk management during project formulation; continue the discussions until 
agreement is reached
– Clearly, carefully document risk posture(s) and rationale(s): project formulation 
agreement, project plan, risk management plan
Educate team reviewers customers and stakeholders regarding the risk posture–  , , ,      , 
assumptions, and ramifications
– Assign risk management process and lead responsibility to one person:                 
define risk board quorum membership to the lowest level of responsibility to keep 
i / tprocess mov ng curren
– Hold regular risk board meetings regardless of schedule pressures
– Incorporate risk posture into all design decisions, including heritage trade studies
– Incorporate risk analysis into all engineering processes        
– Understand new requirements such as Threat Summary Analysis, Protection Plan, and 
Security Plan
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Summary
THE BOTTOME LINE?  Good management and engineering practices are as 
important for successfully managing small projects as for managing large 
projects
Management pitfalls
− Inexperienced, resource-constrained teams
− Constrained cost and schedule   
− Unclear guidelines and requirements
− Changing expectations
− Unrealistic perceptions of process overhead
− Short memories amongst institutional managers
Management tools
− Carefully developed detailed schedule: know risks and critical paths ,       
− Weekly management insight into progress based on EVM
− Frequent formal and informal defined communication
− Careful documentation of risk posture, design decisions, and rationales
− Education of team, reviewers, and stakeholders 
− Re-education of team, reviewers, and stakeholders at every opportunity
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